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Summary findings
The Harrod-Domar  growth model supposedly died long  Easterly traces the intellectual history of how a long-
ago. But for more than 40 years, economists working on  dead model came to Influence today's aid allocation to
developing countries have applied - and still apply  developing countries.
the Harrod-Domar  model to calculate short-run  He asks whether the model's surprising afterlife is
investment requirements for a target growth rate.  attributable to consistency with the 40 years of data that
They then calculate a financing gap between the  have accumulated during its use.
required investment and available resources and often fill  The answer is  no."
the "financing gap" with foreign aid.
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Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Kari Labrie, room N 11-055,  telephone 202-473-1001,  fax 202-522-3518, Internet
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development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to  get the  findings  out quickly,  even if the presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
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Produced by the Policy Research Disse-mination  CenterThe Ghost of Financing  Gap
How the Harrod-Domar  Growth Model Still Haunts
Development  Economics
by William  Easterly'
Vieews  expressed  here are not to be taken as those of the World  Bank. I am grateful  to John Adelman,
Nicholas  Carter,  Norman  Hicks, and John  Holsen  for sharing  their reminiscences  about modelling  in the
World  Bank. I am also very grateful for comments  from Jorge  Araujo,  Nicholas  Carter,  Cevdet  Denizer,
Hinh  Dinh, Richard  Eckaus,  Norman  Hicks, Aart Kraay,  Ross Levine,  Raj Nallari, Guy  Pfeffermann,
Jacques  Polak,  Lant Pritchett,  Dani Rodrik, Jakob  Svensson,  Jos Verbeek,  and to the participants  in a World
Bank seminar,  while absolving  one and all of responsibility  for any errors.2
In April 1946,  Evsey Domar  published  an article  on economic  growth  called "Capital
Expansion,  Rate of Growth,  and Employment."  This article  did not discuss  long run economic
growth; it discussed  the relationship  between  short-term  recessions  and investment  in the United
States.  Domar assumed  that production  capacity  was proportional  to the capital  stock. He admitted
the assumption  was unrealistic.
Eleven years later, complaining  of an "ever-guilty  conscience,"  he disavowed  the original
model altogether.  1 He said his purpose  was to comment  upon  an esoteric debate  on business
cycles,  not to derive "an empirically  meaningful  rate of growth." He said his model made  no
sense  for long run growth. Domar  endorsed  the new growth  model of Robert  Solow,  which would
dominate  economists'  theoretical  approach  to growth  for the next three decades.
To sum up, Domar's model was  not intended  as a growth  model,  made  no sense as.  a
growth model, and was repudiated  as a growth  model forty years ago by its creator.  So it was
ironic that Domar's growth  model  became,  and continues  to be today,  the most widely  applied
growth  model in economic  history.
In this paper,  I tell the story of how Domar's  model (usually  called  the Harrod-Domar
model) survived  its supposed  demise  in the 1950s.  Economists  applied  it (and still do apply  it) to
poor countries  from Albania  to Zimbabwe  to determine  a "required"  investment  rate for a target
growth  rate. The difference  between  the required  investment  and their own savings  is the
Financing Gap. Donors fill the Financing  Gap with foreign  aid to attain  target  growth.  This is not
a story about the long-run relationship between investment and growth -- it's a story about a
model that promised poor countries growth in the short-run through aid and investment.
I tell the story of the Ghost  of Financing  Gap in part I. In part II, I test empirically  how
well the predictions  of the Harrod-Domar  growth  model match  the data. Part III concludes  with
ideas  for future practice.3
I. The Harrod Domar Model, 1946-1997
Domar's approach  to growth  became  popular  because  it had a wonderfully  simple
prediction:  GDP  growth will be proportional  to the share of investment  spending  in GDP. Domar
assumed  that output  (Y) is proportional  to machines (K) available  at the beginning  of the year, i.e.
Y(t) = + K(t-l). Then  Y(t)-Y(t-l)=  [K(t-l)-K(t-2)].  The right-hand  side is just last year's net
investment  I(t-l). Divide  both sides by last year's output. So GDP  growth  this year is just
proportional  to last year's investment/GDP  ratio:2
(Y(t-Y(t-l))Y(-l)  =  +  I(t-l)/Y(t-1)
How did Domar  get the idea that production  was proportional  to machines?  Did not labor
play some  role in production? Domar  was writing  in the aftermath  of the Great  Depression  that
made many  people running  the machines  lose  jobs. Domar and many  other  economists  expected  a
repeat of the Depression  after  World  War II unless  the government  did something  to avoid  it.
Domar  took high unemploymernt  as a given, so there were  always  people available  to run
any additional  machines  that you built. The  problem of balancing  aggregate  demand  and supply
was Domar's concern. Investment  in building  new machines  had a dual  character  -- it added  to
desired  purchases  of goods (demand)  and it also added capacity  (supply).  These  two effects  would
not necessarily  be equal,  Domar argued,  and so the economy  would spiral  off into either chronic
overproduction  or chronic  underproduction.  This was the Harrod-Domar  model.  (Roy Harrod
had published  in 1939  a similar but more convoluted  article,  about which  the less said the better.)
You can see that Domar's interest  was the short run business  cycle. So how did Domar's
fixed ratio of production  to machines  make it into  the analysis  of poor countries'  growth?
The Invention  of Development
For centuries,  nobody had paid much attention  to the economic  problems  of poor
countries.  The League  of Nations 1938  World  Economic  Survey,  prepared  by the future Nobel4
Prize Winner James Meade, included one paragraph on South America.  That was more complete
coverage than poor countries in Asia and Africa received, which was none at all. 3
All this suddenly changed after World War II.  Policy mavens, having ignored poor
countries for centuries, now called for attention to their "urgent problems."4 Everyone suddenly
agreed that the poor countries should "develop." Economists rushed to give policy advice to the
newly independent governments of the poor countries.
The first Development Economists were influenced by two simultaneous historical
events: (1) like Domar, the Great Depression, and (2) the industrialization of the USSR through
forced saving and investment.  The Depression and the large number of underemployed rural
people in poor countries motivated Sir Arthur Lewis to suggest a "surplus labor" model in which
only capital was a constraint. Lewis suggested that building factories would soak up this labor
without causing a decline in rural production.
How many new machines? Lewis and other 195O0s  development economists assumed a
fixed ratio in production between people and machines, i.e. a Leontief production function. Since
you had  surplus  labor,  machines  -- not  labor -- were the  binding  constraint  on production.
Production was proportional to machines, just as in Domar. Lewis suggested that the supply of
available workers was "unlimited." He cited a particular example of an economy that had grown
through pulling in excess labor from the countryside -- the Soviet Union.
Economists usually discussed the growth to investment ratio the other way around -- the
ratio of "required" investment to desired growth.  They called this ratio the Incremental Capital
Output Ratio (ICOR), and thought it was somewhere between 2 and 5.5 Lewis said "the central
fact of economic development is rapid capital accumulation." 6 A country that wanted to develop
had to go from an investment rate of 4 percent of GDP to 12-15 percent of GDP. Investment had
to keep alhead  of population growth. Development was a race between machines and motherhood.5
To give a numerical example -- a country with an investment rate of four percent of GDP
and an ICOR of 4 will have growth of one percent per year.  This does not even keep up with
population growth of, say, two percent a year.  If the country gets investment up to the Lewis
magic number of twelve percent of GDP, then it will have GDP growth of three percent a year.
Now the country is developing, with GDP per capita rising at one percent per year.
How do you get investment high enough? Say current national saving is 4 percent of
GDP.  The early development economists thought that poor countries were so poor they had little
hope of increasing their saving. You have a "Financing Gap" of 8 percent of GDP between the
required investment (12 percent of GDP for 3 percent GDP growth) and the current 4 percent of
GDP level of national savings. So Western donors should fill the "Financing Gap" with foreign
aid, which will make the required investment happen, which in turn will make the target output
growth happen.
The early development economists were hazy about how long it took for aid to increase
investment and in tum increase growth.  In actual use of the model, as we will see below, the
horizons were short-run: this year's aid will go into this year's investment, which will go into next
year's GDP growth.
The ICOR was not a new concept. Domar ruefully mentioned in his 1957 book that an
earlier set of economists very concerned about growth had already used the ICOR -- Soviet
economists of the  1920s. N.A. Kovalevskii, the editor of Planned Economy, in March of 1930
used the ICOR to project Soviet growth exactly the way that development economists were going
to use it from the 1950s through the 1990s.
7 Not only had the Soviet experience inspired the ICOR
model, but the Soviets themselves should get some of the credit for the invention of the ICOR.6
The  Stages  ofRostow
The next step in the evolution of the Financing Gap was to persuade rich nations to fill the
gaps with aid. In 1960, W.W. Rostow published his best-selling The Stages of Economic Growth.
Anticipating the self-help boom, Rostow figured out that all the world loves a stage. Before the
four stages of grief of Kubler-Ross, we had the five stages of growth of Rostow. The stage that
stuck in peoples' minds was the "takeoff into self-sustained growth".
But how was "takeoff'  accomplished? The only determinant of output takeoff that
Rostow cited was investment increasing from 5 to 10 percent of income. Since this was almost
exactly what Sir Arthur Lewis had said six years earlier, "takeoff' just reasserted Domar and
Lewis with vivid images of planes swooping off runways.
Rostow tried to show that the investment-led takeoff fit the stylized facts. Stalin's Russia
influenced Rostow a great deal, as it had everyone else -- it fit the takeoff story. Then Rostow
considered a number of historical and Third World cases. His evidence was weak: only three out
of fifteen cases he cited fit the story of an investment-led takeoff. Kuznets (1963) found his own
independent historical evidence even less supportive of Rostow's story:
In no case do we find during the takeoffperiods  the acceleration in the rate of growth of total national
product  implied in Professor Rostow 's assumptions of a doubling (or more) in the net capitalformation
proportion  and of a constant marginal capital output ratio. The capital  formation proportions, if they rise,
climb ... for a much longer period than the short span of takeoff. Rates of growth ..., if they show any long-
term acceleration (and those for only afew  countries ...) increase slowly...  ,,
(Stylized facts die hard.  Three decades later, a leading economist would write: "One of the
important stylized facts of world history is that massive increases in saving precede signficant
takeoffs in economic growth."9)7
Rostow and Foreign  Aid
Regardless  of the evidence,  the best-selling  Stages drew a lot of attention  to the poor
nations. Rostow  was not the only or even the most important  advocate  for foreign  aid, but his
arguments  are illustrative.
Rostow  played  on Cold War fears in Stages. Rostow  subtitled  The Stages of Economic
Growth,  a little immodestly, A Non-Communist  Manifesto.  Rostow  saw in Russia "a nation
surging,  under Communism,  into a long-delayed  status as an industrial  power of the first order".
Rostow  shared a common  view. Hard as it is to imagine  today,  many American  opinion-makers
thought  that the Soviet  system  was superior  for sheer output  production,  even if inferior  in
individual  freedoms.  In 1950s' issues of Foreign  Affairs, writers  noted  the Soviet  willingness  to
"extract  large forced  savings",  the advantage  of which "it is difficult  to overemphasize".  In
"economic  power",  they will "grow  faster  than we do." Pundits  warned  that the competitor
derived  "certain  advantages"  from the "centralized  character  of the operation".  There was danger
that the Third  World, attracted  by "certain  advantages",  would  go Communist.'°
Rostow  wanted  to show the Third  World  that Communism  was not "the only forn of
effective  state organization  that can ... launch a take-off' (p. 163).  Rostow  offered  a non-
Communist  way.  Westem nations  could  provide  Third  World  nations  with aid to fill the
"financing  gap" between  the necessary  investment  for takeoff and actual  national  saving.  Rostow
used the Harrod  Domar  growth model  to figure  out the necessary  investrnent  (using  an ICOR of 3
to 3.5) for 'takeoff.," 1
The Communist  scare  worked.  US Foreign  Aid had already  increased  a lot under
Eisenhower  in the late 1950s,  to whom Rostow  was an adviser  (Figure 1). Rostow  had also caught
the eye of an ambitious  senator  named John F. Kennedy. Kennedy,  advised  by Rostow,8
successfuilly  got the Senate  to pass  a foreign  aid resolution  in 1959.  After Kennedy  becarne
President,  he sent a message  to Congress  in 1961  calling  for increased  Foreign  Aid:
in our  time  these new  nations  need help  ...  to reach  the stage  of self-sustaining  growth  ... for  a
special reason. Without exception, they are all under Communist pressure..
Rostow  was in govemrnent  throughout  the administrations  of Kennedy  and Johnson.
Under Kennedy,  foreign  aid increased  by 25 percent  in constant  dollars (Figure  1). Under  Johnson
foreign  aid maxed out at $14 billion in 1985  dollars,  equivalent  to 0.6 percent  of American  GDP.
Rostow  and other like-minded  economists  had triumphed  on aid. 12
The US decreased  its foreign  aid after  that peak  under Johnson,  but other  rich countries
more than compensated.  Figure 2 shows  the whole  long upward  trend of total foreign  aid (grants
and soft loans) by the Western  industrial  countries.' 3 Over  the entire  period 1950-95,  the Westem
countries  gave one trillion  dollars  (measured  in 1985  dollars)  in aid. Since  virtually  all of the aid
advocates  used the Harrod-Domar/Financing  Gap model,  this was one of the largest  policy
experiments  ever  based on a single  economic  model.
Don 'tforget  to save
While there  was a remarkable  degree  of consensus  that  the aid to investment  to growth
dogma "was substantially  valid", as Bhagwati's 1966  text put it, there were warnings  about
excessive  indebtedness  to donors. Turkey  had already  developed  debt servicing  problems  on its
past aid loans, Bhagwati  noted.  One early aid critic,  P.T. Bauer,  ironically  noted  in 1972  that
"foreign  aid is necessary  to enable  underdeveloped  countries  to service  the subsidized  loans...
under earlier  foreign  aid agreements."' 4
The obvious  way to avoid  a debt  problem  with official  donors  was  to increase  national
saving. Bhagwati  said this was a job for the state:  the state  had to raise  taxes  to generate  public
savings. 15 Rostow  predicted  the recipient  country  will naturally  increase  its savings  as it takes
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Figure 2: Foreign Aid by All Western Industrial Countries 1950-95
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This emphasis on saving led economists to be optimistic about countries whose mineral
resources gave them a pool of savings.  Kamarck (1967) predicted that Congo (Brazzaville),
Congo (Zaire), Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (using
16 their modem names) were likely to reach or surpass seven percent growth.  [None of these
countries fulfilled Karmarck's prediction. Their median growth 1967-92 was 2.8 percent.]
Hollis Chenery stressed the need for national saving even more heavily in his famous
application of the Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap model.  Chenery and Strout (1966) start off in the
usual way with a model in which aid will "fill the temporary gap between investment ability and
saving ability."'7 Investment then goes into growth with the usual ICOR formulation (assumed as
a matter of convenience).  But they also had a marginal saving rate (i.e. the rate of saving out of
the increase in income). This marginal saving rate had to be high enough for the country to
eventually move into "self-sustained" growth, in which it financed its investment needs out of its
own savings.  They suggested that donors relate "the amount of aid supplied to the recipient's
effectiveness in increasing the rate of domestic saving." (Donors did not follow this suggestion.)
Harrod-Domar meets the computer
Economists computerized Chenery's version of Harrod-Domar at the World Bank in
1971, where Chenery was now the chief economic adviser to Bank President Robert McNamara.
The initial motivation for the modelling was to try to predict which countries were going to get
into debt difficulties. Bank economist John Holsen wrote down during a long weekend what he
called the Minimum Standard Model (MSM). Holsen expected the "minimum" model to have a
useful life of about six weeks. 18 He expected country economists to build more elaborate country
specific models to supplant it.  (As it tumed out, it is still being used today 26 years later.)
Economists Nicholas Carter and Norman Hicks revised the MSM a couple of years later
and renamed it the Revised Minimum Standard Model (RMSM, known as RimSim in Bank10
jargon). 19 The growth part of the RMSM was Harrod-Domar -- the growth rate of GDP was equal
to Investment/GDP (lagged by one year) divided by the ICOR. Or to put it the other way round,
target growth times the ICOR gave investment requirements. Staff (then and now) justified target
growth rates by targets for poverty reduction or employment creation.
For example, in one of the early uses, the World Bank (1975) set target growth at 7.7
percent for Kenya over 1974-78, which implied investment requirements of 26 percent at the
prevailing ICOR of 3.4. Even though this implied a Financing Gap larger than available financing,
the Bank economists said lower target growth of, say, 5 percent was "not an acceptable
altemative" because the income of the poor would fall.  [Kenyan GDP growth over 1974-78 was
4.5 percent.]20
The Financing Gap infommed  discussions with other donors over how much aid or other
financing  that  country  needed.  Following  Chenery  -- and  equally  unheeded  -- the  RMSM  creators
calculated a marginal saving rate and cautioned this had to be high to avoid unsustainable debt.
(Much Latin American and African debt indeed turned out to be unsustainable in the early 80s.)
The use of ICORs and Financing Gaps at the World Bank was not new. A paper in
October 1955 by World Bank economist Dragoslav Avramovic had used the ICOR to discuss
financing needs of Southeast Asian economies.21  In 1964, World Bank economists analyzing debt
sustainability used a Harrod Domar model with exactly the RMSM specification: aid goes into
investment, and investment/GDP divided by the ICOR equals growth in the following year.22
Gettingprices  right
The run of Harrod Domar in development economics was closing even as RMSM spread
throughout the World Bank.  The heyday of the neoclassical critics of development policy, like
Bela Balassa, Amold Harberger, Anne Krueger, and Ian Little, had come. They argued in the
1970s and  1  980s that countries that had not had extensive state planning were doing better than11
those that had. The success  of outward-oriented  East Asia suggested  "getting  prices  right"  was a
secret  to success. The  neoclassical  critics  thought  resource  allocation more important  than
resource  quantity. They  pointed  out growth failures  who had high investment  but "wrong"  prices.
If asked what growth  model  they favored,  the neoclassical  critics  would  usually say the
Solow  model.  They would say countries  that became  more open (got prices  right)  grew faster
because  they reallocated  resources  from low to high productivity  uses. These  efficiency  gains
would  show up in the residual  in the Solow  model (e.g. Harberger  1983).
But vague connections  with the Solow  residual  did not give a way to determine  "aid
requirements."  And there was a logical  fall-back  for defenders  of Harrod-Domar.  Meier's (1995
and earlier  versions)  well-known  book of readings  gave  what quickly  became  a new dogma:
"Although  physical  capital  accumulation  may be considered  a necessary condition  of
development, it has not proved sufficient." 23 As a leading textbook (Todaro 1994) echoes, "the
basic reason  why {the  investment-led  takeoff) didn't work  was  not because  more saving  and
investment  isn't a necessary condition  -- it is -- but rather because  it is not a sufficient
condition." 24 Or for yet another  leading  textbook,  (Gillis  et al. 1996,  p. 301) says  "for countries
with an ICOR  of 3, a necessary, but not sufficient condition  for achieving  sustained  aggregate
growth  in output  of 5 percent is securing  capital  resources  equivalent  to 15  percent of GDP."
The "necessary  but not sufficient"  consensus  gave  Harrod-Domar  a new lease  on life. In
the donor  community  in the 1980s,  aid now often  carried  strict conditions  on "getting  prices
right." But the use of the Harrod-Domar  model for calculating  the "Financing  Gap" continued.
The idea was that Harrod-Domar  gave you the financing  requirements  for the "necessary"
investment,  while conditions  on getting  prices right  would give  you the "sufficient"  conditions  for
growth.12
Unfortunately,  enforcement  of "getting  prices right"  turned out to be more  difficult  than
expected  Oust  as enforcing  saving  conditionality  had earlier).  Bumside  and Dollar 1996  find no
evidence  that aid affected  countries'  policies either  positively  or negatively  over 1970-93.25  The
designers of conditionality  did not fully  appreciate  the Samaritan's  dilemma  -- that a soft-hearted
donor cannot credibly  commit  to withhold  funds  even if the recipient  violates  the conditions
(Svensson 1997). The Financing  Gap calculation  itself created  perverse  incentives,  since  - if the
saving conditionality  proved ineffective  -- it gave  more aid  to countries  that saved less.
Harrod-Domar  in The New Growth  Literature
Harrod-Domar  survived  even  a whole  new wave of theorizing  about  growth. Ironically,  at
first the new growth  literature seemed  to support  the Harrod-Domar  linear growth-investment
relationship. Paul Romer  early on (1987) suggested  that there  WAS a linear relationship  between
output and physical capital.  He started  from  the Cobb-Douglas  version  of the Solow  model
(Y=AKaL1'), but suggested  that there was a "leaming  by doing" externality  from physical  capital
to technological  knowledge  (K) so that production  was given  by:
Y=AKaLl  Kp
If you then assumed  that a+3=1, as Romer  (1987)  suggested  it was convenient  to do, then you got
a linear relationship  between output  and capital. He found comfort  for this view  in cross-section
regressions  in which  growth was significantly  and linearly  related  to the investment  rate. (Romer
(1987)  makes  no reference  to the longstanding  linear growth-investment  relation  in development
economics.)
However,  Romer  soon  became  disenchanted  with the arbitrary  assumption  that physical
capital would automatically lead to a technological spillover (and of just the right amount to give
constant returns to capital).  In a recent survey article on the new growth literature, Romer (1994
p. 20) said that his "greatest regret" was "the emphasis on physical capital" in his 1987 paper. He13
soon turned  to models  of endogenous  creation  of new ideas  and new goods  -- models  that were
very far from a linear relationship  between  output  and physical capital. As he put it in another
article, developing countries suffered not from an Object Gap -- like lack of physical capital - but
rather an Idea Gap -- lack of technology (Romer 1993).
Another production  function  in the new growth  literature  that seemed  in the spirit  of
Harrod-Domar  was Rebelo's (1991)  classically  simple  model  that Y=AK. This model  had the
short-run  linear payoffs  to investment  that the Harrod-Domar  users  had promised.  However,
Rebelo said he meant K to include  not just physical  capital,  but all kinds of capital  such as human
capital, organizational  capital,  and technological  knowledge. Rebelo's formulation  wound  up
undermining  Harrod  Domar  by adding  many  more factors  of production.  There  could  be too much
physical capital relative  to human  capital,  for example,  so it was  hard to know  whether  physical
capital investment  should increase  or decrease  if you want growth  to increase. 26
This paper  is not about  the long run relationship  between  investment  and growth (about
which there is still considerable  controversy  in the current  growth  literature.)27  In the short run,
we do not know  much about  the how long it will take for productive  investment  to translate  into
growth,  and in what amounts.  Even  when  just one other  factor--  human  capital  -- is included,  the
dynamics  are enormously  variable  (Mulligan  and Sala-i-Martin  1993).
Harrod-Domar  in the 90s
The Harrod  Domar  growth  model still lives  today in many  intemational  organizations.
Over 90 percent of country  desk economists  at the World Bank,  for example,  use some variant  of
RMSM today to make projections.28  They still make (optimistic)  assumptions  about  ICORs and
national  saving -- World  Bank RMSM-based  growth  forecasts  have systematically  been  too
optimistic  --  and still calculate  the Financing  Gap. Bank staff still present  the result of this
calculation at meetings where aid donors agree upon aid amounts for a specific country. The14
donors and multilaterals also apply analytical and strategic judgment to determine the aid given,
of course, but the number produced by RMSM influences the outcome.
World Bank economists created an extended version called RMSM-X around 1990; I was
one of the contributors.  We made extensions to the framework by adding fiscal and monetary
balances. Unfortunately, we left unchanged the ICOR and Financing Gap core of the model.
(While in this confessional mood, I will also acknowledge that there are some ICORs in my own
sordid past.) According to the Spring 1995 RMSM-X reference guide, in the model today "the
ICOR and prior investment determine GDP." 30
The Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap shows up not only in the quantitative calculations of
the RMSM-X; it also shows up in the thinking about development expressed by many
international organizations.  Let's  start with several country examples.
Economists used the model even when the model clearly wasn't  working. Total GDP in
Guyana fell sharply from 1980 to  1990, as investment was increasing from 30 percent to 42
percent of GDP, 3' and while foreign aid every year was 8 percent of Guyana's GDP. 32 The public
World Bank report in 1993 argued that Guyana "will continue to need substantial levels of foreign
capital inflows ... to provide sufficient resources to sustain economic growth". 33
Economists used the model amongst recovery from civil war.  Bank economists
programmed the Ugandan economy in 1996 to grow rapidly (at the ubiquitous 7 percent). With
little savings and an ICOR of  3 implying substantial investment requirements, this implied high
foreign aid inflows. The World Bank's public report on the economy argued for the high aid
because anything less "could be harmful for medium-term growth in Uganda, which requires
external inflows..."34
Economists also used the model amongst the chaotic transition from Communism to
capitalism. The Bank's  1993 report on Lithuania said that "large amounts of extemal assistance15
will be required" in order to "provide the resources for critical investments" to stem the output
decline .3 5 (P.  20)
Economists used the model in the aftermath of macroeconomic crises. The Bank in 1995
told Latin Americans that "enhancing savings and investment by 8 percentage points of GDP
would raise the annual growth figure by around 2 percentage points." 36 (i.e. an ICOR of 4).
The World Bank is not alone; virtually all intemational institutions addressing the needs
of poor countries stress the short-run necessity of both investment and aid for growth. The
International Monetary Fund (IMF) today trains developing country officials to project
investment requirements as the "target growth rate times the ICOR."37  The IMF in its own
writings also expresses confidence in a short-run investment-growth link. "Africa's  economic
performance is expected to improve in 1992-93", but the improvement in these two years hinges
on  -- among  other things  -- "the increase  in investment  that  is needed  to promote  economic
groNvth."  [IMF (1992, p. 18)] For Africa, "official financing on concessional terms will be
necessary, but not sufficient, to improve growth prospects." [IMF (1993, p. 79)3 In a different
region, the IMF in 1996 told the ex-Communist countries in Europe that "raising investment rates
to 30 percent of GDP" would "double projected growth rates.""iS
The Inter-american Development Bankc  (1995) worried about "the challenge of sustaining
the level of investment necessary for continued output growth." 39 Things looked better the next
year, when the IDB (1996) noted an investment recovery in the 1990s that helped explain in the
short-run  'the improved growth performance during the 1990s.'AO
The European Bank for  Reconstruction and Development in 1995 announced it was using
the "Harrod-Domar growth equation" to project investment requirements. This equation warned
the ex;-Communist  countries that "investment finance of the order of 20 percent or more of GDP
will be required" to reach "growth rates of 5 percent" (there's that ICOR of 4 again). 4'16
So the circle of irony closes. The Communist economies had partly inspired the ICOR, the
Cold War inspired foreign aid, and now the Capitalist economies gave foreign aid to ex-
Communist economies in amounts influenced by the ICOR. 42
II. Testing  the Financing  Gap model
As far as I know, nobody has done a full-scale test of the model with cross-country data.
It's easy to understand why.  By the time that large-scale cross-country datasets became available,
the model had already fallen out of favor in the academic literature. Yet, as we have seen, the
model lives on in the determination of aid requirements and growth prospects of poor countries.
Research should test not only models that dominate the academic literature, but also models that
dominate applied economics practice. Let's now test this model.
Aid to investment
When Harrod-Domar users calculated aid requirements as the excess of "required"
investment over actual saving, their presumption was that aid will go one for one into investment.
Moreover, aid givers talked about conditionality that would require countries to increase their rate
of national saving at the same time, which some thought would even happen naturally, as we saw
above,  So aid combined with conditionality should increase investment by even more than one to
one.  Let's  see what actually happened.
We have 88 countries on which we have data spanning the period 1965-95 (Table I).4
How many of these countries show a significant and positive relationship of foreign aid to
investment, with a coefficient greater than or equal to one?  Well before getting to these niceties,  I
have to point out that 60 percent of the countries show a negative relationship between foreign aid
and investment (Table 1).  Just 6 of the 88 countries pass the test of a positive and significant
coefficient greater than or equal to one.  The magic six include two economies with trivial
amounts of aid:  Hong Kong (which got an average of .07 percent of GDP in aid 1965-95) and17
China (average of 0.2 percent of GDP).  The other four --  Tunisia,  Morocco, Malta, and Sri
Lanka -- did have nontrivial amounts of aid.  The other 82 countries fail the test.
Table 1: Results of regressing Gross Domestic Investment/GDP on
ODA/GDP country by country, 1965-95
Coefficient of Investment on ODA  Number of  Percent of Sample
countries
Total  88  100%
Positive, significant, and >=1  6  7%
Positive and significant  17  19%
Positive  35  40%
Negative  53  60%
Negative and significant  36  41%
This result is reminiscent of the results of Boone (1994), who found a zero coefficient on
aid in a cross-section investrnent regression. Unlike Boone (1994), I do not intend here to make a
general statement about whether foreign aid is effective. There are many problems in doing such
an evaluation, most of all the endogeneity of aid.  It could be that in any given country that there
was an adverse shock like a drought that caused investment to fall and aid to increase. I am only
testing the first link in a particular model -- the Financing Gap/Harrod Domar model. I am asking
whether investment and aid jointly evolved the way that the users of this model expected. The
Harrod Domar aid advocates anticipated that aid would go into investment, not into tiding
countries over droughts. According to Table 1, investment and aid did not evolve the way they
expected.
Investment to growth
The second link in the Financing Gap/Harrod-Domar model is the linear growth-
investment relationship. Does the linear investment - growth relationship work well in the data?
Of course if we recalculate ICOR every period to be (Lagged Investment/GDP) over Growth, then18
the relationship holds tautologically.  What we really want to know is if the relationship has some
predictive power, i.e. if we can predict growth with a constant ICOR.
I use Summers and Heston data for GDP and Investment so that the Investment/GDP
ratios are in common intemational prices and comparable across countries. There are 4883 annual
observations in a pooled sample of data over 1950-92, with at least partial data for 146 countries.
A reasonable reader will object at this point that the use of annual data is inappropliate for a long
run relationship  like investment and output. I agree. I use annual data only because that is what
most applications of the Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap model use (for example, RMSM-X in the
World Bank). I will experiment with four-year averages below.
I start out imposing the same ICOR across all countries (an assumption I will relax in a
moment). I will regress GDP growth on Lagged Investment/GDP in the entire pooled annual
sample for 146 countries 1950-92. Note that the Harrod-Domar formulation suppresses any
constant term (as does the RMSM version of it in the World Bank).  Here is the estimated
relationship:
GDP Growth =  0.186748 * Lagged Investment/GDP  R2= -0.062  4883 observations
(0.004467)
In the entire pooled sample, the ICOR is 5.35. The R-squared is negative, which is of course
possible in a regression that omits a constant term.4  The negative R-squared says that we could
predict growth better by projecting the global average growth for all countries and years.  The
ICOR model just does not fit growth, as Figure 3 makes clear.
How much is the omission of a constant causing the poor results? With a constant the
relationship becomes:
GDP  Growth  = 0.033 + 0.039* Lagged Investment/GDP  R2= 0.003  4883 observations
(0.002)  (0.0099)glagi  cht
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With a constant (which is highly significant and so rejects the proportionality of growth to
investment of Harrod-Domar), variations in lagged investmentlGDP now explain 0.3% of the
variation in annual growth rates. The coefficient on lagged investment is statistically significant
but not of the right magnitude. The implied ICOR on marginal changes in investment is 26, which
would certainly result in a large Financing Gap.
One more thing I can try with the marginal ICOR idea is to run the above equations in
first differences.  This would remove any country fixed effects and give us the pure time
dimension of the data, which is what ICOR users emphasize. The results of this experiment are
discouraging. The change in lagged investment explains nothing of the change in growth: the R-
squared is  0.000002 with a constant and -0.0002 without one.  The coefficient yields an ICOR of
277.
To check how much the poor performance of the Harrod-Domar model is due to the use of
annual data, I also tried a pooled regression on four-year averages. I lagged investment by one
four-year period, giving me about a thousand observations. Five years is a common forecast
horizon on country desks in the World Bank. Country economists usually project the first year
exogenously, so 4 years is de facto a common horizon.
The results with four-year averages do not bode well for Harrod-Domar. The R2 is -.26 in
the regression without a constant (the estimated ICOR is 5.6). In the regression with a constant,
the R2 is 0.0008, lagged investment is statistically insignificant, and the implied ICOR is 100
(results available upon request).45 In first differences with four-year averages, I at last get a
positive R-squared in a regression without a constant; unfortunately, the relationship between the
change in growth and the lagged change in investment is negative.
Let's  now allow the ICOR to vary across countries by regressing growth on lagged
investment to GDP individually for each country.  We have 138 countries with at least 1020
observations on growth and lagged investment. When we regress growth on lagged investment,
we have the same  problem  as in the pooled  model  with no constant:  well over half of the countries
have a negative  R-squared  (Table  2). We would  have been  better off predicting  growth  in each
country  by just presuming  it was constant  (at its historical  average,  for example). Moreover,  to
make things worse,  of the countries  with positive  R-squared,  only half of them -- less than a fifth
of the sample -- have an ICOR in the "reasonable"  range between  2 and 5 (some  restriction  to a
"reasonable  range"  is desirable  because  the estimated  ICORs in this sample  vary from -35 to 18).
Table 2: Regressing  GDP growth  on lagged
Investment/GDP  with no constant,  for each
country,  1950-92
Number of  Share of
countries  sample
Total  138  100%
R2>0 and  2<ICOR  <5  26  19%
R2>0  50  36%
R2<0  88  64%
Table 3 shows  the results of including  a constant  in these  country  by country  regressions.
Table 3: Results of regressing  GDP Growth  on Gross  Domestic  Investment/GDP  with a
constant,  country  by country,  1950-92
Coeff  icient of Growth  on Investment/GDP  Number of Percent
countries  of
Sample
Total sample  138  100%
Positive,  significant,  "zero"  constant,  and 2<ICOR<5  4  3%
Positive  and significant  11  8%
Positive  77  56%
Negative  61  44%
Negative and significant  10  7%
Only a small fraction  of the countries  have  a positive  and significant  relationship  between  growth
and lagged investment,  and an even  smaller fraction  are in the "usual" ICOR  range  betveen 2 and
5.  I also require  these countries  have a constant  insignificantly  different  from zero  to fit Harrod-21
Domar.  The four economies  that pass  the Table 3 test are an unusual  assortment:  Israel,  Liberia,
Reunion  (a French colony),  and Tunisia. 46
Remembering  the few countries  Nwhere  the aid-to-investment  link worked  as expected,  I
can now say that the Financing  Gap/Harrod-Domar  model fits one country:  Tunisia.
Unfortunately,  1 success  out of 138  countries  is likely to have occurred  by chance  even if the
model made  no empirical  sense -- which so far the evidence  says it doesn't.
Is investment necessary in the short-run?
For the other 137 countries,  the ritual incantation  of practitioners  at this point is that
"investment  is necessary  but not sufficient."  Table 4 shows  how often  the necessary  investment
rates (lagged  one period)  accompany  one-year  high growth  episodes  over 1950-92  (defining  high
growth  as 7 percent  or above,  a desideratum  often mentioned,  as we have seen). 47 At the
optimistic  ICOR of 2 we have  less than half of the sample  complying  with  the necessary
conditions.  At the "normal"  ICOR  of 3.5, nine-tenths  or more of the sample  violate  the
"necessary"  condition.  At an ICOR  of 5, the "necessary"  investment  accompanied  just I percent
of the high growth episodes.  (Recall  that the regressions  estimated  ICOR  to be above 5 in both the
annual  and four-year-average  datasets).
The second  column  of Table 4 shows how  many four-year-long  growth  episodes  were
accompanied  by the necessary  investment  rates (lagged  one period).  There  were no four-year  high
growth episodes  that had the "required"  investment  implied  by an ICOR of 5; even at the highly
optimistic  ICOR of 2 just half of the episodes  had the "required"  investment.  At the short-run
horizons  at which development  analysts  work, there is no evidence  that investment  is a necessary
condition  for high growth.22
Table  4: How "necessary"  is investment  in the short  run?
High growth episodes (7 percent  or above) that have  "required" investment/GDP  (%):
Period lengths
Assuming  ICOR  of.  Annual averages  Four-year averages
5  1%  0%
3.5  9%  11%
2  37%  49%
Note: investment  is lagged one period,for  both 1-year and 4-year averages.
Using the 1-year and 4-year averages for both growth and investment, let's  also look at
episodes where growth increased and see how often investnent  increased by the "required
amount." Table 5 gives us the answer: during episodes of increased growth with four-year periods,
investment increased by the "required amount" between 6 and 12 percent of the time, depending
on the ICOR. The other 88 to 94 percent of the episodes violated the "necessary condition". Of
course, the data are even more unkind to the "necessary condition" with annual averages.
Empirically speaking, increases in investment are neither necessary nor sufficient for increases in
growth over the medium run.
Table  5: How "necessary"  is increased  investment  in the short  run?
Increased growth episodes that have  "required" increase in investment/GDP  (%):
Period lengths
Assuming  ICOR  of:  Annual averages  Four-year averages
5  3%  6%
3.5  4%  6%
2  7%  12%
Note: investment  is lagged one period, for  both 1-year and 4-year averages.
Jointly evaluating the aid-to-investment and investment-to-growth links
We can construct a counterfactual of what income a country would have achieved if the
predictions of the Financing Gap/Harrod Domar model had been correct, and then compare the
counterfactual to the actual outcome. The Model predicts that aid goes into investment one to one,
or more. I stick to the one to one prediction to be conservative. So investment/GDP will increase23
over the initial year by the amount that aid/GDP increases over the initial year.  Then this
investment will increase growth, with a one year lag. (I will use an ICOR of 3.5 since it's the mid-
point of the commonly cited 2 to 5 range.)  This predicts total GDP growth. To get per capita
growth, we subtract population growth (remember in Harrod-Domar, more labor does not increase
total GDP). So we have the prediction:
GDP  Growth per capita = (Initial Investment/GDP + Aid/GDP (minus Aid/GDP in initial
year))/ICOR  - Population  growth
Figure 4 shows the comparison of Zambians' actual average income to what would have
been, if filling the Financing Gap in the Harrod-Domar model worked. Zambia would today be an
industrialized country, instead of being one of the poorest countries in the world. Zambia is one of
the worst-predicted cases because it initially had a high investment rate and it got a lot of aid.
Zambia's  investment rate went down, not up, as the aid increased and the investment in any case
did not yield ICOR-like growth. 45
Figure 5 shows the predicted Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap growth for all of the aid
recipients.  I show predicted per capita growth on the horizontal axis and actual per capita growth
on the vertical axis.  If the equation had predicted growth well, we would exTect  to see points
clustering along the 45% line through the diagram. We do not see such a clustering. We have
predicted superstars like Guinea-Bissau, Jamaica, Zambia, Guyana, Comoros, Mauritania, and
Zimbabwe, countries who instead turned out to be growth disasters. We have real superstars like
Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia that the equation did not pick up. The correlation of actual and
predicted growth is slightly negative.
Another way that we can evaluate the Harrod-Domar/Financing Gap model is to test the
constraints it puts on the coefficients of a cross-section growth regression. I regress average
growth per capita 1960-92 on initial investment/GDP, average aid/GDP, and average population
growth. The unconstrained regression looks like this:gap  cht
Figure 4: The Gap between Harrod-Domar and Reality in Zambia
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Growth per capita = 2.92  - .004 (Initial invsmt/GDP) - .119 (Aid/GNP) -.330 (Pop growth)
(0.86)  (.023)  (.033)  (0.274)
72 observations, R2=.181
The Harrod Domar/Financing Gap model predicted that the constant would be zero, the
coefficients on initial investment and Aid would be equal and positive, and the coefficient on
population growth would be -1.  All of these predictions are rejected. The constant is significantly
above zero.49  The coefficient on Aid/GNP is significantly negative.50  The coefficient on
population growth is significantly different from -1 (people do contribute to GDP apparently).
Suppose I run constrained least squares imposing all of the predictions of the Harrod-
Domar/Financing Gap model:
Growth per capita =.171 *(Initial invstmt/GDP  + Aid/GDP) - 1 (Population growth)
(.022)
72 observations, R2=-1.75
Here the only free parameter being estimated is the (equal) coefficient on Initial Investment/GDP
and Aid/GDP, which comes out to imply an ICOR a little over 5. I impose the constant to be zero
and the coefficient on population growth to be -1.  These constraints do so much violence to the
data as would eam them a life sentence in most states. The R2 tums sharply negative, as can
happen with constrained least squares.  I perform an F-test of the null hypothesis that all three
constraints (zero constant, equal coefficients on investment and aid, and -1 on population growth)
hold.  I reject the null hypothesis rather emphatically: the P-value for the test statistic is 7.3E-18
(about 1 in 100 quadrillion).
III. Conclusions
The Harrod Domar growth model lies behind Financing Gap calculations that influence
economic policy and the allocation of aid resources. Yet, the Harrod Domar growth model makes
no sense theoretically and it fails empirically.25
It is not hard to think of better rules for determining  aid arnounts  per country  than Filling
the Financing  Gap. Donors could  allocate  aid per capita  to poor countries  according  to which
countries  have the best track records  on economic  policies. Likewise,  it's not hard to think of
better  ways  of projecting  growth  than to use a model  that makes  no sense theoretically  and fails
empirically.  Country  economists  could  project  growth subjectively  using world average  growth,
the country's  historical  average  growth,  country  policies, and extemal  conditions. International
organizations  spending  money on running Harrod-Domar/Financing  Gap models  could perhaps
put those resources  to better use elsewhere.
Even  for countries  that do not receive  aid, like most in Latin America,  the Harrod-
Domar/Financing  Gap  model is not a reliable  guide  to policy. For example,  as we have seen,
ICOR  calculations  often  lead to urgent calls for increasing  saving.  This in turn leads  to calls for
the government  to increase  saving, much  like in the 1  960s  (cf. Bhagwati  1966  above). Since a
decline  in private saving offsets  40 to 60 percent  of any increase  in public saving (Serven  and
Schmidt  Hebbel  (1997),  p. 92), one also has to make  the far from obvious  case  that government
can use these savings  better  than private firms and households.
This paper also raises  the question  of how such a wide gap developed  between  the
academic  growth literature  and the applied economists  trying  to get real economies  to grow. I
suspect  that once such a wide gap opens, incentives  are weak on both sides  to close  it.
In sum, there is no theoretical  or empirical  justification  for assuming  a short-run
proportional  relationship  between  investment  and growth. There  is no theoretical  or empirical
justification  for calculating  a "financing  gap" between  "investment  requirements"  and saving.
There  is no theoretical  or empirical  justification  for using such  a "financing  gap" calculation  to
influence  policy or the allocation  of foreign  aid. After forty  years, the Ghost of Financing  Gap can
finally be laid to rest.26
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so I don't intend this to be a test of whether aid raises or lowers growth; it's  simply a test of whether this set
of variables jointly  evolved as the Harrod Domar/Financing Gap Model predicted they would.  I would
have to address the selection bias problem that more aid will be given to those that have low income or
adverse exogenous income shocks to address the efffect of aid on growth, as studies like Boone (1995) and
Bumaside  and Dollar (1996) have done. However, the users of the Harrod-Domar model did not intend aid
to be cushioning adverse shocks, so the negative coefficient contradicts their expectation that aid would go
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